In this paper, we analyze the impact of interchange fees on consumers' and merchants' incentives to adopt an innovative payment instrument, in a setting where two issuing banks compete to attract consumers on the Hotelling line, while exerting some market power over an installed base of consumers on their hinterländer. We show that the relationship between consumer adoption and interchange fees is non monotonic, when there are adoption externalities between consumers and merchants. We also compare the issuers' incentives to innovate when they cooperate and when they make their innovation decisions separately.
Introduction
Innovations in retail payment systems have proliferated on the market over the last ten years.
Contactless payments, mobile payments, P2P payments are currently mentioned as the future payment media of a "cashless society". However, paradoxically, the adoption of innovations in retail payment systems is slow. As in other network industries, …rms have to attract a critical mass of users for the market to take-o¤. Up to now, banks have relied on the business model of interchange fees in payment card systems to provide consumers with incentives to use their cards.
This business model is increasingly challenged in various countries and jurisdictions (e.g. in the US in 2011) 1 , giving rise to regulatory uncertainty for innovative payment solutions. This paper adresses two important issues for competition and regulatory authorities. First, do interchange fees increase the adoption of innovations in retail payment systems? Second, does cooperation between issuing banks lead to more innovation? The main contribution of our paper is to show that positive interchange fees favor consumer adoption of innovations only if merchants exert low externalities on consumers.
To study the impact of interchange fees on innovation, we build a theoretical model in which two issuing banks compete to o¤er an innovative payment instrument to consumers. We model innovation as an improvement in the quality of the payment instrument, which increases its value for consumers. The acquiring side of the market is assumed to be perfectly competitive. On the issuing side, we assume that both issuers compete on the Hotelling line. Each issuer has also an installed based of consumers, which is located on its hinterland. The consumers that are located on a bank's hinterland can only buy the payment instrument from their bank, whereas the consumers that are located on the linear city can choose between the two …rms. The issuers charge …xed fees for the adoption of the payment instrument and do not charge transaction fees. Once a consumer has adopted the innovative payment instrument, we assume that he makes one transaction at each merchant's who accepts it. Our model takes into account adoption externalities, since the value of adopting the payment instrument for a consumer increases with the number of merchants who accept it. On the merchant side, merchants decide whether or not to adopt the payment instrument based on their net transactional bene…t and on the number of transactions that are made by consumers, since they need to cover their …xed adoption costs.
In our baseline model, quality levels are exogenous. We focus on the impact of interchange fees on consumers'and merchants'incentives to adopt the innovation. Banks set an interchange fee to maximize their joint pro…t at the …rst stage of the game. At the second stage, the issuers compete in prices. Finally, consumers and merchants decide whether or not to adopt the payment instrument.
Our results show that the relationship between interchange fees and consumer adoption is non monotonic. This conclusion is in sharp contradiction with the widespread intuition that positive interchange fees bene…t consumer adoption. We show that this may be the case only if consumers do not value a lot the presence of merchants on the platform, that is, if the degree of externality is low. If consumers value the presence of merchants on the plaform, the interchange fee that maximises consumer adoption may be equal to zero. Our result can be explained by the complex impact of interchange fees on consumer adoption. In our framework, two e¤ects are at play when the issuers increase interchange fees: a price e¤ect and a quality degradation e¤ect. In the payment cards literature literature, the price e¤ect is always positive, since the issuers pass through higher interchange fee to consumers through lower prices. In our paper, the price e¤ect may be negative in some cases, as the issuers charge only a lump-sum fee for consumer adoption. Therefore, when the interchange fee increases, fewer merchants adopt the innovation, which increases the perceived marginal cost of an issuer, as interchange fee revenues per consumer are reduced. Furthermore, if the degree of externality is high, higher interchange fees reduce the utility that consumers obtain when they adopt the innovation, as the number of adopting merchants decreases. This quality degradation e¤ect is always negative, and may even compensate the price e¤ect if the latter is positive. By contrast, we show that, in our linear setting, merchant adoption decreases with the interchange fee if banks are su¢ ciently di¤erentiated. Finally, we obtain intuitive results about pro…t-maximising interchange fees. When consumers do not value the presence of merchants on the platform, while the reverse is true, the platform sets an interchange fee that favors consumer adoption over merchant adoption. By contrast, if consumers value merchant adoption, the platform sets an interchange fee that favors merchant adoption. We also prove that the pro…t-maximising interchange fee is suboptimally high compared to the welfare-maximising interchange if issuers' prices are more sensitive to a higher interchange fee than the number of merchants.
The model is then extended to the case of endogenous investments in quality. The game that we study is as follows. At the …rst stage, banks set an interchange fee to maximize their joint-pro…t.
At the second stage, banks choose cooperatively or non cooperatively the quality of the innovation that they o¤er to their consumers. At the second stage, they compete in prices. Then, at the last stage, consumers and merchants make their adoption decisions, based on the price and the quality of the payment instrument. Our aim is to compare two compare two competitive equilibria: the equilibrium in which banks cooperate to invest in innovations and the equilibrium in which banks do not cooperate. When quality levels are endogenous, the main di¤erence with respect to our baseline model is that issuing banks now exert externalities on each other when they choose how much to innovate. If an issuer decides to innovate more, this generates more adoption from its consumers, which increases merchants' adoption because of adoption externalities. In turn, this generates more adoption for its competitor, who bene…ts from a higher number of merchants. [To be written] While the impact of interchange fees on innovation in retail payment systems has generated rich policy debate, few academic papers have adressed this issue. Our paper is among the …rst theoretical contributions to analyze whether interchange fees increase issuers'incentives to innovate and consumers'incentives to adopt innovative payment solutions.
In the literature on payment card systems, the adoption decisions are generally overlooked by considering that consumers' and merchants' decisions to use and to adopt an electronic payment instrument are equivalent (See Chakravorti (2010) or Verdier (2011) for a survey). One exception is the paper by Bedre and Calvano (2011) , who model adoption and usage decisions as being distinct choices. They show that a monopolistic issuer chooses interchange fees that exceed the social optimum because merchants cannot refuse payment cards once they have accepted them.
Our paper departs from their work in several directions. In their paper, as in ours, the number of cardholders depends on the number of merchants who adopt, because consumers value the expected bene…t of being able to pay by card. However, the number of merchants who adopt does not depend on the number of cardholders because there are no …xed adoption costs. It follows that, in their paper, merchants accept cards when their net bene…t of being paid by card is positive. By contrast, our paper captures the fact that merchants accept innovative payment instruments when they expect a su¢ ciently high volume of transactions to cover their …xed costs. There is another important di¤erence between our paper and theirs. We consider, in line with most of the empirical observations, that consumers pay a …xed membership fee, while they do not pay transaction fees.
And …nally, we consider the quality of the innovation as endogenous.
Our paper also contributes to the scarce literature on investments in two-sided markets. Most papers in this literature deal with di¤erent issues. For instance, Peitz and Belle ‡amme (2010) study the e¤ect of the intermediation mode (for-pro…t competing platforms versus free access) on sellers' investment incentives, in a model where sellers' investment increase the buyers' utility of belonging to the platform. They show that for-pro…t intermediation may lead to overinvestment when innovations increase buyers' surplus, because competing intermediaries react by lowering the access fees on the seller side. The perspective of our work is di¤erent, as we consider the intermediation mode as given, and we consider the case of a four-party payment platform, which corresponds to the speci…c case of the retail payments industry. In our paper, competition takes place at the bank level and not at the platform level as in Peitz and Belle ‡amme (2010). Hagiu (2009) analyzes platform strategies when users di¤er across their average quality. He …nds that, in this context, platforms may …nd it pro…table to exclude low quality users on one side, even though some would be willing to pay the platform access price. Our paper considers that all merchants exert the same degree of externality on consumers. Though we think it would be another interesting research question, we do not assume that some merchants bring more value to consumers than other.
Finally, in the payment systems literature, Verdier (2010) studies the impact of interchange fees on monopolistic banks' incentives to invest in quality of a payment card system. In her framework, investment decisions occur on both sides of the market. She …nds that a reduction of interchange fees is socially desirable if the acquirers contribute a lot to investments in quality and if consumers bene…t more than merchants from quality investments. Our paper deals with a di¤erent case, since investment decisions are made by …rms who compete on the same side of the market (the issuing side).
Finally, our paper extends the analysis of cooperation strategies to platform markets. The literature has shown that cooperation between competitors can be socially bene…cial when the degree of spillovers at the R&D stage is su¢ ciently high (see, for example, Katz (1986) and d'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) ). In our setting, the externality between consumers and merchants plays a similar role as spillovers: an issuer's R&D investment bene…ts the rival issuer through the link with the other side of the market (the merchants'side). We …nd that cooperation on one side of the market is socially bene…cial if the externality between the two sides is su¢ ciently strong.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce our model. In Section 3, we analyze the impact of interchange fees on consumers'and merchants'adoption decisions. In Section 4, we endogenize the choice of quality levels. We compare two equilibria: an equilibrium in which banks choose the quality of the payment instrument non cooperatively, and an equilibrium in which banks cooperate on the choice of quality. Finally, we conclude.
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We build a model which enables us to study how interchange fees impact users'incentives to adopt an innovative payment instrument. In our framework, two issuers o¤er a new electronic payment instrument to consumers, such as mobile payments. Consumers'incentives to adopt the electronic payment instrument depend on the number of merchants who adopt the new technology, and vice versa.
Banks: We consider two issuers that are located at the extremities of a linear city of length one, and that compete by o¤ering electronic payment instruments to consumers. The …rst issuer, that we denote by issuer 1, is located at point 0, and the second issuer, that we denote by issuer 2, is located at point 1.
There is a mass 0 of consumers that are uniformly distributed along the city (the Hotelling line). On each side of the city, we add an hinterland in which there is a mass 0 of consumers.
The …rm's hinterland goes from one of the extremes of the city to in…nity. 2 All consumers hold cash to pay for their expenses, but they can decide to adopt the electronic payment instrument o¤ered by the issuers. The consumers located on …rm i's hinterland can only buy the payment instrument from …rm i, whereas the consumers that are located on the linear city can choose between the two …rms.
Issuing banks compete in prices to attract consumers. They charge consumers with …xed fees for adopting the innovation but transactions are free. 3 The marginal cost of o¤ering the electronic payment instrument to customers is denoted by k I , whereas the marginal cost of transactions is normalized to zero. 4 Issuer i = 1; 2 o¤ers a quality i to consumers. 5 Though the two …rms can o¤er electronic payment instruments of di¤erent qualities, we assume that their payment technologies are compatible on the merchants'side. 6
2 Each hinterland represents a base of captive customers for one of the issuers. The existence of a captive base of customers for each bank could be explained by the presence of switching costs in the banking industry (for deposits, across products and areas). For estimates of the switching costs in the banking industry, see for instance Kiser (2002) , Shy (2002) , or Kim & al. (2003) . 3 Our aim is to model consumer adoption of innovative payment solutions. Therefore, consistent with market practices (for Internet Payments, for debit cards), it seemed to us relevant to use …xed adoption fees on the consumer side and free transactions. 4 We consider that there is no transaction price, which corresponds to the standard pricing scheme for debit cards. For simplicity, we also normalize the marginal cost of transactions to zero. 5 In the baseline model, we assume that quality levels are exogenous. In Section 4, we allow the issuers to decide, cooperatively or non-cooperatively, on the quality levels. 6 This means that merchants who have adopted the electronic payment instrument can accept payments from either of the two issuers.
The acquirers are assumed to be perfectly competitive. They charge a fee m to merchants for each electronic transaction. Without loss of generality, their marginal cost for transactions is normalized to zero. 7 Each time a consumer uses the electronic payment instrument, the acquirer pays an interchange fee a to the issuer of the consumer's payment instrument. 8
Consumers: Consumers have to decide whether or not to adopt the electronic payment instrument that is provided by the two issuers. 9 Once the consumer has adopted the electronic payment instrument, he makes one transaction with each merchant equipped with the new payment technology. The consumer's choice of a payment instrument depends on whether the consumer is located on the Hotelling line or on one of the …rms'hinterländer.
The utility of a consumer located at point x on the linear city who purchases the payment instrument o¤ered by issuer i, located at point i , is given by:
where v B > 0 is the surplus of adopting the electronic payment instrument, i is the quality of issuer i's payment service (e.g., applications that help consumers manage their payments), p i is the …xed adoption fee paid to the issuer , t is the transportation cost, B 0 represents the transactional net bene…t from using the electronic payment instrument at merchants', and n S is the number of merchants equipped with the technology. 10 We refer to B as the "degree of externality," as it measures the externality exerted by merchants on consumers. In our framework, B stands for buyer, and S for seller.
With this formulation, the utility obtained by a consumer when he adopts the electronic payment 7 We assume a linear tari¤ on the merchant side. However, since the acquirers are perfectly competitive, it would be equivalent to assume a two-part tari¤ on the merchant side.
8 This assumption is consistent with the industry practices in innovative markets such as Internet payments, mobile payments... However, one could think of other business models for innovative payment instruments. 9 In our framework, we assume that it is never in the consumer's interest to buy the electronic payment instrument from both issuers, and hence, each consumer chooses between purchasing the payment instrument from issuer 1 or issuer 2, or not purchasing it (i.e., single-homes).
1 0 Strictly speaking, we should write here the expected number of merchants. However, consistent with the two-sided market literature (e.g., Caillaud and Jullien, 2003) , we assume that consumers have rational responsive expectations. This means that consumers form their expectations after …rms have chosen their qualities and prices. Therefore, to clarify the exposition, we will only refer to the actual number of merchants. The same remark applies for the number of consumers. Other forms of expectations in the network economics literature include the concept of ful…lled passive expectations which has been introduced by Katz and Shapiro (1985) . See Hurkens and López (2010) for a discussion and comparison of rational responsive expectations and ful…lled passive expectations. instrument increases with the number of merchants that are equipped with the technology and with the quality of service provided by the issuer. Note that, as the issuers'payment technologies are assumed to be compatible, the consumer's utility depends on the total number of merchants who adopt the electronic payment instrument. 11 We assume that v B is su¢ ciently large such that the market is covered in equilibrium. This assumption means that the consumers who are located on the linear city never pay cash, and trade o¤ between buying the electronic payment instrument from bank 1 or from bank 2.
The utility of a consumer located at a distance y from …rm i on …rm i's hinterland is given by
We assume that …rm i's hinterland is su¢ ciently large such that it is not covered in equilibrium.
That is, in equilibrium, some consumers do not adopt the electronic payment instrument. The total number of consumers of bank i who use the electronic payment instrument is denoted by D i B .
Merchants: There is a mass 1 of monopolistic merchants, 12 who have to decide whether or not to adopt the new payment technology. Merchants are heterogenous with respect to the …xed cost F S of adopting the new payment technology. 13 The …xed cost of adopting the new technology is uniformly distributed on [0; 1]. 14 The merchants all have the same transaction bene…t b S > 0.
Each time a consumer pays with the new payment instrument, the merchant pays a merchant fee m to the acquirer.
Finally, we make the following assumptions.
Assumption 2:
1 1 In our framework, if nS = 0, consumers still derive a positive utility from adoption, vB + i, because for example the new payment instrument can be used at ATMs or abroad.
1 2 This normalization is done without loss of generality, as the mass of merchants a¤ects only the externality term in the utility function of consumers. Therefore, what matters is the product of B by the number of merchants. An increase in the mass of merchants can be interpreted as an increase in the externality parameter, B .
1 3 The adoption cost includes, for example, the cost of the new equipment, the cost of training sta¤ for the new payment methods, etc. Fixed costs might di¤er, for example, because merchants have di¤erent skills in using payment systems, or di¤erent opportunity costs in using an electronic payment instrument instead of cash (e.g., due to di¤erent levels of fraud).
1 4 With a general distribution, there are no simple conditions that ensure that issuer prices are strategic complements and that, at the same time, the second-order condition for pro…t maximization for the issuer prices is satis…ed.
Assumption 1 ensures that an issuer has a strictly positive demand when it sets its price at marginal cost. Assumption 2(i) implies that n S is uniquely de…ned in equilibrium. Assumption 2(ii) ensures that the second-order condition for the issuers' pro…t maximization with respect to prices is satis…ed. Finally, Assumption 2(iii) implies that an issuer's demand is increasing with the rival issuer's price.
Timing of the game:
1. The interchange fee is set either by a regulator, or by the payment association.
2. The issuers choose the price of the electronic payment instrument, and the acquirers choose the merchant fee.
3. Consumers and merchants decide whether or not to adopt the new payment technology.
We look for the subgame perfect equilibrium of this game, and solve the game by backward induction.
Equilibrium
In this section, we study how the interchange fee a¤ects the adoption of the new technology, for given quality levels.
Stage 3: Adoption of the electronic payment instrument
Consumer adoption. We start by studying the consumers'adoption decision. All consumers who are located on the linear city trade o¤ between buying the electronic payment instrument from issuer 1 or from issuer 2. 15 A consumer who is located at point x buys from issuer 1 rather than issuer 2 if and only if:
that is, if
On issuer i's hinterland, a consumer located at y 0 buys the electronic payment instrument if
The demand of issuer i for the electronic payment instrument is given by the sum of its demand on the linear city and on its hinterland, that is,
for all i 2 f1; 2g, where = ( 1 ; 2 ), and P = (p 1 ; p 2 ). The total demand for the electronic payment instrument is given by:
Note that D B increases with the number of merchants who accept the electronic payment instrument, and that its sensitivity to the number of merchants depends on a term, 2 B =t, which increases with the degree of externality B .
Merchant adoption. We consider now the merchant's decision of whether or not to adopt the electronic payment instrument. A merchant obtains a net transactional bene…t (m) = b S m when a consumer pays with the electronic payment instrument. Given that D B consumers are using the electronic payment instrument at each merchant's, a merchant with a …xed adoption cost F S decides to adopt the electronic payment technology if and only if
Note that it must be that (m) 0, otherwise no merchant would adopt the electronic payment technology. In the rest of the analysis, we assume that this condition holds.
Since F S is distributed uniformly over [0; 1], the mass of merchants who adopt the electronic payment instrument is implicitly de…ned by
Under Assumption 2(i), e n S is uniquely de…ned and belongs to [0; 1]. Using (2) and (3), the mass of merchants who adopt the innovative payment instrument is e n S ( ; P; m) = (m) e n 0 S ( ; P; m), 16 where
represents the merchants'demand where there are no externalities (i.e., when B = 0), and
Since (m) is strictly positive 17 and increases with the degree of externalities B , it can be interpreted as a multiplier e¤ect of the externalities on merchants' adoption. 18 To explain this multiplier e¤ect, assume that a unit mass of consumers decides to adopt the electronic payment instrument. This increases the number of merchants who adopt the electronic payment instrument by (m). In turn, this generates more adoption on both issuers'hinterländer. From (2), the increase in the total number of consumers is equal to 2 B (m) =t. For a similar reason, the number of merchants is raised by 2 B ( (m)) 2 =t, which in turn increases the number of consumers of both …rms by (2 B (m) =t) 2 . At the end of the day, repeating this reasoning an in…nite number of times, we …nd that the number of consumers is increased by (m), which is given by (5).
Similarly, let e D B ( ; P; m) D B ( ; P; e n S ( ; P; m)) and e D i B ( ; P; m) D i B ( ; P; e n S ( ; P; m)).
The number of consumers who adopt the electronic payment instrument can be written as e
is the consumers' demand for the electronic payment instrument when there are no externalities (i.e., B = 0). Finally, from equation (1), the mass of consumers of issuer i = 1; 2 is
1 6 If e n 0 S < 0, no merchant adopts the electronic payment instrument (i.e., e nS = 0), whereas if e n 0 S > 1, they all adopt (i.e., e nS = 1). 1 7 Indeed, from Assumption 2(i), t > 4bS B implies that t > 2 (m) B . 1 8 This multiplier e¤ect is similar to the one found in Jeon, Jullien and Klimenko (2011).
Comparative statics. From now on, we restrict our analysis to the case of an interior solution, where e n S 2 (0; 1). We have the following comparative statics.
Lemma 1
The mass of merchants who adopt the electronic payment instrument decreases with the prices chosen by the issuers and the acquirers, and it increases with the levels of quality. It also increases with the degree of externality, B , and the size of the hinterländer, .
Proof. See Appendix A1.
Higher prices for consumers or lower quality levels decrease total consumer demand, and thus merchant adoption, due to the externality.
Lemma 2 The mass of consumers who adopt the electronic payment instrument decreases with the prices chosen by the issuers and the acquirers, and it increases with the levels of quality. It also increases with the degree of externality, B , and the size of the hinterländer, .
Proof. See Appendix A2.
When an issuer increases its price (resp., decreases its quality), the total consumer demand is reduced because of two e¤ects. First, this price increase (resp., quality reduction) has a negative direct e¤ect on consumer utility. Second, it has an negative indirect e¤ect on the number of merchants who decide to adopt the electronic payment instrument. Note also that, because of the adoption externality, the consumer demand decreases with the merchant fee, as a higher merchant fee reduces the number of merchants, which in turn lowers consumer demand.
Finally, we study how an issuer's demand is a¤ected by its own price (resp., quality) and by its rival's price (resp., quality). De…ne (m) @ e D i B =@p i . For issuer i = 1; 2, we have
Since (m) < 0, we have the standard e¤ect that an issuer's demand decreases with its own price,
However, due to the externality between the consumer side and the merchant side, the e¤ect on an issuer's demand of the price or the quality level that is chosen by the other …rm is less clear-cut.
Indeed, for i; j = 1; 2, and j 6 = i, we have
and
Equations (9) and (10) show that competition between the two issuers with respect to prices or qualities gives rise to two con ‡icting e¤ects. On the one hand, if the rival …rm decreases its price (resp., increases its level of quality), a …rm faces a reduction of its demand, which corresponds to the standard e¤ect of competition (the …rst term in equations (9) and (10)). On the other hand, a lower price from the rival …rm (resp., a higher level of quality) attracts more merchants due to the externality e¤ect, which in turn increases the consumer demand for the …rm. This e¤ect corresponds to the second term in equations (9) and (10). 19 In a pure Hotelling setting with = 0, only the competition e¤ect would be present, whereas in a pure local monopolies setting with = 0, only the externality e¤ect would be operational.
In our framework, Assumption 2(iii) ensures that the …rst e¤ect always dominates the second e¤ect, and, therefore, an issuer's demand increases with the price chosen by its rival (i.e., (m) > 0).
Lemma 3 summarizes the impact of prices and quality levels on an issuer's demand.
Lemma 3 An issuer's demand decreases with its own price (resp., increases with its level of quality), whereas it increases with the rival issuer's price (resp., decreases with its rival issuer's level of quality).
Proof. See Appendix A3.
At this stage, banks compete in prices. As the acquirers are perfectly competitive, the merchant fee is equal to m = a in the equilibrium of the subgame, where a denotes the interchange fee paid by the acquirers to the issuers. We now proceed by determining the equilibrium for issuers'prices.
To simplify the exposition, in what follows, we replace m for m = a.
Price equilibrium. Each issuer i = 1; 2 chooses the price p i that maximizes its pro…t,
The issuer receives a price p i from each consumer who adopts its electronic payment instrument, and an interchange fee revenue ae n S e D i B from acquirers. We denote M i = p i + ae n S k I issuer i's margin, and
the sensitivity of an issuer's margin to the price of its rival. 20 The …rst-order condition is then
whereas the second-order condition always holds as 21
The …rst-order condition (12) shows that the issuer trades o¤ between increasing its margin and increasing the volume of transactions. Note that, due to interchange fee revenues and indirect externalities, the marginal e¤ect of a price increase on the issuer's margin ( ) is lower than one, that is, lower than in the standard Hotelling model.
In Appendix B2, we prove that, under Assumption 2, prices are strategic complements. We denote x i and y i the mass of consumers who adopt issuer i's electronic payment instrument on the Hotelling line and on issuer i's hinterland, respectively, when both issuers set their prices to zero.
Finally, we denote d i = x i + y i . We can now characterize the price equilibrium.
Lemma 4 In equilibrium, issuer i charges a price
where n S = e n S j P =(0;0) .
Proof. See Appendix B3.
In the symmetric case, where the two issuers o¤er the same quality of service , the equilibrium issuer price simpli…es to
,
Since the denominator of p is always strictly positive, 22 everything else equal, the issuer price is higher when the "market size" d is higher and when the number of merchant adopters when issuers'prices are equal to zero, n S , is higher.
In the pure Hotelling setting, where = 0, the symmetric equilibrium price becomes p = t + k I an S (a). The price is equal to the transportation cost of consumers minus the perceived marginal cost of an issuer, which depends on interchange fee revenues per consumer.
Comparative statics. The symmetric equilibrium price p can be a priori either increasing or decreasing with the degree of externalities B . 23 On the one hand, when the externalities are stronger, the value of adopting the innovation increases for consumers, which provides an issuer with incentives to extract more rents by charging higher adoption prices. Since prices are strategic complements, the other issuer reacts by increasing its price. On the other hand, the issuer's margin increases through higher interchange fee revenues, which amounts to a reduction of its perceived marginal cost. This e¤ect provides the issuer with the incentive to lower its price.
We denote by n S ( ; a) = e n S ( ; P ; m ) and D B ( ; a) = e D B ( ; P ; m ) the mass of merchants who adopt the new technology and the consumer demand, respectively, at the equilibrium of the price-setting subgame.
Stage 1: Interchange fee
We now analyze the impact of the interchange fee on users' decisions to adopt the new payment technology. We start by studying how the interchange fee a¤ects the price of the electronic payment instrument for consumers, and the adoption decisions of consumers and merchants. Then, we determine the pro…t-maximizing interchange fee.
Impact of the interchange fee on the issuers'prices. An important question is whether raising the interchange fee leads to lower prices for consumers. In Appendix C1, we show that dp i =da has the same sign as @ 2 i =@p i @a. From the …rst-order condition (12), we have
An increase in the interchange fee has therefore di¤erent and opposite e¤ects on issuer i's price.
First, it lowers the number of consumers who adopt the EPI, which reduces the issuer's incentive to increase its price. This corresponds to the …rst term of equation (14), which is negative as
Second, the sensitivity of consumer demand to the issuer's price decreases, and therefore, the issuer's incentives to lower its price are reduced-this corresponds to the second term of equation (14), which is positive as 0 (a) = ( (a) =t) 2 B > 0. Finally, the sum of the third and fourth terms of (14) can be written as
Since < 0 from (8) and > 0, this expression has the sign of a (a) (a), which is negative for low values of the interchange fee, and positive otherwise. 24 On the one hand, the revenue per transaction becomes higher when the interchange fee increases, which provides the issuer with an incentive to increase its price. On the other hand, the number of merchants who adopt the EPI is reduced, which gives the issuer a countervailing incentive.
To sum up, the impact of the interchange fee on the issuer's price is a priori ambiguous. We can however show the following result for the symmetric equilibrium price.
Proposition 1 If b S = B is su¢ ciently high (i.e., higher than 2 ( + ) = ((2 + ) (3 + ))), the symmetric equilibrium issuer's price varies non-monotonically with the interchange fee; it is decreasing for low values of the interchange fee, and increasing otherwise. For lower values of b S = B , the issuer's price always decreases with the interchange fee.
Proof. See Appendix C3.
This non-monotonic relationship between the issuer's price and the interchange fee is in contrast with the literature (e.g., Rochet and Tirole (2002 and 2003) , Wright (2002 and 2004) ), which usually assumes that the interchange fee corresponds to a reduction of the issuer's marginal cost that is passed through to consumers.
In our framework, two e¤ects are at play, an interchange revenue e¤ect and a quality degradation e¤ect. First, the equilibrium issuers' prices are a¤ected by the interchange fee revenues, which depend on the number of transactions, e n S . As the interchange revenue (ae n S ) is increasing with the interchange fee for low values of the interchange fee, and decreasing otherwise, the price o¤ered to consumers for the electronic payment instrument tends to decrease for low values of the interchange fee, and to increase for high values of it. In the literature, this e¤ect is not present, because issuers charge per-transaction prices, whereas in our framework, they charge only a lump-sum adoption fee.
Second, since consumers value the presence of merchants, an increase in the interchange fee can be interpreted as a lower quality of service for consumers, as it leads to a lower number of merchants. Issuers react to this quality degradation e¤ect by lowering their prices.
When b S = B is low, interchange fee revenues are of a low magnitude as merchant adoption is low, and the quality degradation e¤ect dominates the interchange fee revenue e¤ect. We then have the standard e¤ect that the issuers' prices decrease with the interchange fee. By contrast, when b S = B is su¢ ciently high, the interchange fee revenue e¤ect dominates the quality degradation e¤ect, and the issuers'prices vary non-monotonically with the interchange fee.
In the pure Hotelling setting, where = 0, the prices charged by the issuers decrease with the interchange fee for a b S =2, and then increase with the interchange fee.
E¤ect of the interchange fee on the adoption of the innovation. We now study the e¤ect of the interchange fee on the adoption of the new technology by consumers and merchants.
Since D B = (a) e D 0 B (p 1 ; p 2 ), the e¤ect of the interchange fee on consumer adoption is given by
.
A higher interchange fee has two di¤erent e¤ects on consumer adoption. The …rst e¤ect is the quality degradation e¤ect, which is negative and represented by the …rst term in the above equation; a higher interchange fee reduces the number of merchants, which lowers the adoption bene…t for consumers. The second e¤ect is a price e¤ect, which is ambiguous as shown in Proposition 1.
If dp i =da 0, we have dD B =da 0, that is, a higher interchange fee reduces adoption by consumers. If dp i =da 0, the sign of dD B =da is indeterminate. On the one hand, a higher interchange fee decreases the fees charged to consumers for the electronic payment instrument, which increases consumer demand. On the other hand, it increases the merchant fee, which reduces the number of merchant who adopt the innovation. This, in turn, decreases the number of consumers who adopt the innovation.
The following Proposition shows that consumer adoption can vary non-monotonically with the interchange fee. Proof. See Appendix C4.
This result shows that, due to the externality, consumer adoption is strongly linked to merchant adoption. As a consequence, to ensure adoption on the consumers'side, the interchange fee should be set at a level that will also foster adoption on the merchants'side, that is, not too high. At the extreme, the value of the interchange fee that maximizes consumer adoption can even be zero.
The e¤ect of the interchange fee on the merchants'adoption is given by
As on the consumers'side, merchant adoption is strongly linked to consumer adoption. If consumer adoption decreases with the interchange fee, that is, if dD B =da 0, the number of merchants who adopt the new payment technology also decreases with the interchange fee. This is because merchants have to pay a higher price to use the new payment technology, while a smaller share of consumers adopts the innovation when the interchange fee increases.
By contrast, if dD B =da 0, raising the interchange fee causes ambiguous e¤ects on merchants'
adoption. On the one hand, a higher interchange fee increases the merchant fee, which reduces the pro…tability of merchants, and hence, the number of merchants who adopt the new technology. On the other hand, a higher interchange fee yields to a higher volume of transactions for merchants, as it decreases the price of the new technology for consumers (since dD B =da 0 implies that dp i =da 0). This e¤ect provides merchants with higher incentives to adopt the new technology.
We prove that, under our assumptions, if the transportation cost is su¢ ciently high, the former e¤ect always dominates the latter, that is, dn S =da 0.
Proposition 3 If the transportation cost t is su¢ ciently high, merchant adoption decreases with the interchange fee.
Proof. See Appendix C5.
As we show in Appendix C5, in our setting, merchant adoption can increase with the interchange fee only in some particular cases, where the transportation cost is very low and close to the minimal value imposed by Assumption 2. Otherwise, merchant adoption is reduced when the interchange fee becomes higher.
Figures 1a and 1b below illustrate the two di¤erent cases that occur in most cases, according to our results in Propositions 2 and 3. 25 In both …gures, merchant adoption is higher when the interchange fee is higher. In Figure 1a , the degree of externality if low, and consumer adoption varies non-monotically with the interchange fee. By contrast, in Figure 1b , where the degree of externality is higher, consumer adoption decreases with the interchange fee. In this latter case, users'adoption is maximized by setting a zero interchange fee. Pro…t-maximizing interchange fee. The payment platform sets the interchange fee so as to maximize banks' joint pro…ts. As the acquirers are perfectly competitive, this amounts to maximizing the issuers'pro…ts,
We start by analyzing the e¤ect of an increase in the interchange fee on issuer i's pro…t, which is given by
From the envelop theorem, we have @ i =@p i j P = 0. Furthermore, dm (a) =da = 1. Therefore,
+ dp j (a) da
The interchange fee impacts issuer i's pro…t through a direct e¤ect and two indirect e¤ects, which depend respectively on the merchant fee and on the price that is chosen by the rival issuer at the price competition stage of the game. The direct e¤ect is positive, as n S e D i B > 0. This is because a higher interchange fee enables the issuer to obtain higher revenues per transaction. The …rst indirect e¤ect is negative, as @ i =@m < 0. A higher merchant fee lowers issuer i's pro…t as the number of consumers and merchants who adopt the innovation decreases, and hence, the number of transactions is reduced. The sign of the second indirect e¤ect can be either positive or negative. As shown in Proposition 1, depending on the value of b S and on the interchange fee, the price chosen by the issuer can either increase or decrease with the interchange fee. Furthermore, it can be shown that @ i =@p j j P > 0 if t is su¢ ciently high. 26 The payment platform chooses an interchange fee which re ‡ects a trade-o¤ between increasing the interchange fee revenues, lowering the number of adopting merchants, and thus consumer demand, and impacting the price competition that takes place at stage 2.
We denote by a S , a B , a V and a the interchange fee that maximizes merchant adoption, consumer adoption, the volume of transactions, and the issuers' pro…ts, respectively, in a symmet- We now proceed by comparing a S , a B , a V and a in two simple benchmark cases. First, consider that there is no externality on the consumers'side, that is, B = 0. We …nd that a = a B = b S =2
and that a V 2 [0; b S =2). Therefore, a S a V < a B = a . In other words, the pro…t-maximizing platform sets the interchange fee at a level that maximizes consumer adoption, but which is too high to maximize merchant adoption or the volume of transactions. Intuitively, since consumers do not value the presence of merchants on the platform, whereas the reverse is true, the platform favors consumer adoption over merchant adoption.
Second, consider the pure Hotelling case, where = 0. As the total demand is constant and equal to , consumer adoption is insensitive to the interchange fee, while the number of adopting merchants is equal to (a), and hence, independent of consumer adoption. Thus, the pure Hotelling case can be interpreted as a situation where there is no externality on the merchants' side. We …nd that a S = a V = 0, whereas a B 2 [0; b S ] and a 2 [0; b S ]. In this case, as consumers value merchant adoption, whereas the reverse is not true, the platform may favor merchant adoption over consumer adoption.
In the general case, where > 0 and B > 0, there are two di¤erent cases. First, if consumer and merchant adoption decrease with the interchange fee, we have a B = a S = a V = 0. 28 From Proposition 2, this happens if the degree of externality B is high and if b S is low. A su¢ cient condition for the pro…t-maximizing interchange fee to be equal to zero is that the issuers'margin decreases with the interchange fee at a B . Otherwise, if n S is su¢ ciently high at a B , the pro…t-maximizing interchange fee can a priori be greater than zero. Welfare-maximizing interchange fee. Now, we consider the case where the interchange fee is set by the regulator. The regulator chooses the interchange fee to maximize social welfare, which is de…ned as the sum of users'surplus and issuers'pro…ts. We denote by a W the welfare-maximizing interchange fee, and de…ne u = v B + + B n S p . We …nd that a a W if
otherwise, we have a a W . 29
In other words, given that dn S =da < 0, the pro…t-maximizing interchange fee is suboptimally high if at a = a , prices are more sensitive to a higher interchange fee than the number of merchants.
In particular, we have a a W if dp =daj a=a > 0. 2 8 Similarly, if bS is close to zero, we also …nd that a B = a S = a V = 0. 2 9 See Appendix C8 for the detailed analysis.
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In this Section, we extend our baseline model to study issuers'incentives to upgrade the quality of the electronic payment instrument, and the e¤ect of the interchange fee on investment incentives.
We compare two di¤erent scenarios: (i) the issuers set the levels of quality non-cooperatively, and
(ii) the issuers cooperate to improve the quality level of the electronic payment instrument. We assume that when the issuers cooperate to develop the electronic payment instrument, they set the levels of quality jointly, but do not share the investment costs. 30 O¤ering a level of quality i to consumers costs C ( i ) to …rm i, with C 0 ( i ) 0 and C 00 ( i ) 0.
The timing of the game is modi…ed as follows:
2. The issuers choose cooperatively or non cooperatively the levels of quality.
3. The issuers choose the price of the electronic payment instrument, and the acquirers choose the merchant fee.
Consumers and merchants decide whether or not to adopt the new payment technology.
The analysis of stage 3 and stage 4 is similar to the baseline model. We start by analyzing the e¤ect of a change in the quality levels on equilibrium prices, then we determine the equilibrium with and without cooperation.
The e¤ect of quality levels on equilibrium prices
With the following Lemma, we characterize the e¤ect of the quality levels on the equilibrium prices.
Lemma 5 The price chosen by issuer i = 1; 2 increases with its level of quality, i , and decreases with the level of quality chosen by the rival issuer, j .
Proof. See Appendix D1.
When …rm i = 1; 2 increases its quality, i , from Lemma 2, for given prices, its consumer demand increases, as a result of both a direct and an indirect e¤ect. First, …rm i can charge a higher price to its consumers due to the additional surplus provided by a higher quality level to its consumers and the increase in merchant adoption. Second, the rival issuer can also charge a higher price to its own consumers when the number of merchants increases. Since prices are strategic complements, issuer i reacts by increasing its price.
By contrast, the incidence of the quality that is chosen by …rm j on …rm i's price re ‡ects two con ‡icting e¤ects. First, there is a competition e¤ ect. If …rm j increases its quality level, it becomes more attractive to consumers. Firm i then reacts by reducing its price. However, this reaction is o¤set by …rm i's trade-o¤ between competing with …rm j on the linear city and extracting consumer surplus on its hinterland. Firm i's reaction is all the more aggressive as the size of the hinterland is small. Second, there is an externality e¤ ect. When …rm j increases its quality, from Lemma 1, this increases the demand of merchants, which has a positive impact on …rm i's attractiveness for consumers. Therefore, …rm i can increase its price. 31 In our setting, due in particular to the uniform distribution for F S , the competition e¤ect always dominates the externality e¤ect.
No cooperation 4.2.1 Stage 2: investment decisions
We now study the choice of quality levels for the payment instrument when banks do not cooperate.
Let e i ( 1 ; 2 ) = (p i ( 1 ; 2 ) + ae n S ( ; P ( )) k I ) e D i B ( ; P ( )) denote issuer i's pro…t, gross of investment cost, at the equilibrium of stage 3. At stage 2, each issuer i = 1; 2 sets its level of quality i so as to maximize its pro…t,
where P = (p 1 ; p 2 ). From the envelop theorem, the …rst order condition is
The second order condition for a local maximum holds if C( ) is su¢ ciently convex, and we assume that it is the case (see Appendix D2 for a discussion -A REFAIRE).
3 1 Note that the magnitude of this externality e¤ect is higher when or B is higher. It follows that, when is high, the externality e¤ect dominates the competition e¤ect, whereas the reverse is true when is low.
The derivative of the issuer's pro…t with respect to the level of quality is expressed as a sum of a direct and an indirect e¤ect. The direct e¤ect on the issuer's pro…t, gross of investment cost, can be written as 32
Since < 0 and 0, the direct e¤ect of the level of quality on the issuer's gross pro…t is always positive. Taking prices as constant, a higher quality implies a higher demand, which bene…ts the …rm; this corresponds to the …rst term in (17). Furthermore, a higher quality increases merchant adoption, which in turn raises interchange fee revenues -see the second term in (17).
The indirect e¤ect is given by
. (18) To understand the sign of the indirect e¤ect, we start by assuming that the interchange fee is equal to zero, which implies that = 0. The …rst term into brackets into equation (18) is then positive, as Lemma 3 shows that > 0. As @p j =@ i < 0 from Lemma 5, the indirect e¤ect is negative if there is no interchange fee. The intuition is that, if …rm i invests in quality, it generates an aggressive reaction from its rival in terms of lower prices, which hurts the …rm's pro…t.
When the interchange fee increases, the reaction of the rival can be o¤set by higher interchange fee revenues, as the number of merchants who adopt the electronic payment instrument increases when the rival issuer reduces its price. Therefore, when the interchange fee is high, the indirect e¤ect may become positive (to check: is it possible under our assumptions and conditions).
Finally, if the interchange fee becomes close to its maximum value, that is a = b S , the merchants' transaction bene…t, (a), is equal to zero. In this case, the indirect e¤ect is negative, as = 0 if
The following table summarizes the sign of the direct and the indirect e¤ect in the noncooperative case. 
... Numerical examples; …gures.
Est-ce qu'on peut avoir une expression pour theta*?
E¤et de l'IF sur theta*?
Cooperation
We now proceed by analyzing quality investment decisions at stage 2 when the issuers cooperate on the quality choices.
Stage 2: investment decisions
The issuers choose cooperatively the levels of quality 1 and 2 so as to maximize their joint pro…t,
Di¤erentiating the joint pro…t with respect to i , and using the envelop theorem, we have
The direct e¤ect of the level of quality of …rm i on joint pro…t, gross of investment costs, is
At the symmetric equilibrium, the direct e¤ect can be rewritten as
We can compare the direct e¤ect with cooperation to the direct e¤ect without cooperation, which is given by equation (17).
Note that there are two di¤erences. First, when the issuers cooperate, they internalize the competition for market shares which is embedded in quality decisions. Therefore, the direct e¤ect is reduced when there is cooperation, and hence, issuers have less incentives to invest. This can be seen by the fact that the term 1 2t in equation (17) is absent in equation (20). Second, when the …rms cooperate, they internalize the e¤ect of each issuer's quality choice on the hinterland demand of the other issuer, which increases through a rise of the number of merchants who adopt the innovation.
This gives issuers incentives to invest more, when they cooperate. Note that, when or B are very low and if the interchange fee is low, the …rst e¤ect dominates, and hence, the direct e¤ect is reduced. Whereas, if or B are su¢ ciently high, or if the interchange fee is high, the second e¤ect can dominate, and the direct e¤ect is then increased. [other e¤ect: internalize all IF revenues] The indirect e¤ect is given by
Compared to the non cooperative case, the two issuers internalize the indirect e¤ect of i not only on …rm i's pro…t but also on …rm j's pro…t (see the second term of (21)).
We start by assuming that the interchange fee is equal to zero. The second term (21) is positive as @p i =@ i > 0 from Lemma 5 and = @ e D i B =@p j > 0, which increases investment incentives compared to the non-cooperative case. When the interchange fee increases, the second term in equation (21) can become negative, as @e n S =@p i < 0 from Lemma 1, which means that quality investment incentives may be reduced relative to the non cooperative situation.
The comparison between the quality levels in the cooperative and non cooperative cases depends on how …rms trade o¤ between the direct and the indirect e¤ect of the quality choice on …rms' pro…ts. If the interchange fee is su¢ ciently small, cooperation tends to reduce the direct e¤ect, which decreases …rms' incentives to invest in quality. However, cooperation tends to increase the indirect e¤ect, as a higher i implies a higher price for …rm i, which increases the demand and hence the pro…t of …rm j. Whether cooperation increases or decreases investments in quality depends on the variation of each of these two e¤ects with respect to the cooperative case. On the contrary, if the interchange fee is high, cooperation tends to increase the direct e¤ect, which provides …rms with higher incentives to invest in quality. However, in this case, it decreases the indirect e¤ect.
Similarly, cooperation may either increase or decrease …rms'investments in quality.
Therefore, the variation of the quality levels in the cooperation case with respect to the non cooperative case may be very similar with low and high, but for very di¤erent reasons.
Cooperation
Direct e¤ect Indirect e¤ect
Interchange small (+)
Investments increased compared to cooperation.
Interchange high (+)
Investments decreased compared to cooperation. Firm i's higher price reduces …rm j's pro…t.
Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze the impact of interchange fees on consumers'and merchants'incentives to adopt an innovative payment instrument, in a setting where two issuing banks compete to attract consumers on the Hotelling line, while exerting some market power over an installed base of consumers on their hinterländer.
We show that the relationship between consumer adoption and interchange fees is non monotonic, when there are adoption externalities between consumers and merchants. Our results contradict the widespread intuition that high interchange fees favor consumer adoption over merchant adoption.
We show that this may the case only if merchants do not exert strong externalities on consumer adoption, under the assumption that merchants incur …xed adoption costs. When the degree of externalities is high and when the merchant adoption bene…t is low, the interchange fee that maximises consumer and merchant adoption is equal to zero. The pro…t-maximising interchange fee exceeds the welfare-maximising interchange fee when issuers'prices are more sensitive to a higher interchange fee than the number of merchants at the pro…t-maximing interchange fee.
We also compare the issuers'incentives to innovate when they cooperate and when they make their innovation decisions separately. [To be written]
Appendix A2: Proof of Lemma 2
as @e n S =@m < 0. Similarly, we have d e
as @e n S =@ B > 0. We also have
as e y i = (v B + i + B e n S p i )=t > 0 and @e n S =@ > 0.
Appendix A3: Proof of Lemma 3
From (7), we have
Since t 2 ( + ) (b S m) B t 2 ( + ) b S B , and since from Assumption 2(iii), t
B dp j ,
Appendix B2: Prices are strategic complements
Proof. From the …rst-order condition (12), we have
We now prove that @ 2 i =@p i @p j > 0. From Lemma 1, we have @e n S =@p j 0. From Lemma 3, (a) > 0, (a) > 0, and (a) < 0. From Assumption 2(ii), 1 (a) > 0. Hence, @ 2 i =@p i @p j > 0.
From the implicit function theorem, since @ 2 i =@p 2 i < 0, prices are strategic complements, that is,
denotes the best-response of issuer i.
Appendix B3: Proof of Lemma 4
From the FOC (12), the price chosen by issuer i at the equilibrium of stage 2 solves
solving for p i and p j in (27), we obtain that the price chosen by issuer i at the equilibrium of the subgame is Since under Assumption 2(iii),
then E decreases with a. We also …nd that E (a = a max = b S ) = ( + 4 ) = (2t) > 0, and therefore, E > 0 for all a a max .
Appendix B5: Sign of dp =d B
We have
where In equilibrium, we have
where R i and R j denote the best-response functions of …rm i and …rm j, respectively. We have
which simpli…es to dp i da 1
We start by proving the following result.
Lemma 6
Proof. Using the implicit function theorem, we have
As the second-order condition of pro…t maximization is veri…ed at P , we have
We now prove that
From (13),
Besides, we have
Since (a) = (a) =t, we have
From (C1-2) and (??), we have
From (C1-2) and (??), we have X = (a) (1 2 (a)) t (1 (a)) and Y = (a) (2 (a)) (1 (a)) (a).
From (11), we have
Since a b S (otherwise, no merchant would adopt the electronic payment instrument), we have
Since (a) > 0, (a) < 0, 1 2 (a) > 0 and 1 2 (a) > 0, we have X 0 and Y 0. As XY 0, we can conclude that
which proves the Lemma.
From (C1-1) and Lemma 6, dp i =da has the same sign as
From the implicit function theorem, we have
Replacing for @R i @a P , @R i @p j P and @R j @a P in (28), we obtain that dp i =da has the same sign as
it follows that dp i =da has the same sign as
< 0 from (C1-2) and since @ 2 i @p i @p j p > 0 from (C1-3), it follows that dp i =da has the same sign as
The denominator of (C2-1) is strictly positive. The numerator of (C2-1) has an inverted bell curve, and it attains its minimum in t at t = a B + (3=2) B b S , which is lower than the minimum value of t imposed by Assumption 2(i), that is, t = 4 B b S . We …nd that
Therefore, for all values of t that satisfy Assumption 2, and for all a, we have h 0 (a) > 0. Besides, h (0) < 0 and h (a max ) > 0. Hence, h(a) is negative for low values of a, and positive otherwise.
Appendix C3: Proof of Lemma 1
First, we compute the derivative of the issuer's price in the symmetric equilibrium at a = 0. We
where P (t) = 2 B ( + ) + b S (2 + ) (3 + )t 2 2 B ( + ) (5b S + 2 B + 2b S )b S t + 4b 3 S 2 B 2 ( + ) 2 . Therefore, @p =@aj a=0 < 0 if and only if P (t) > 0. As the coe¢ cient of the t 2 factor is positive, this second-order polynomial is U-shaped, it and has two positive roots. The highest root is
We …nd that t + < 4 B b S , and therefore from Assumption 2(i), we always have t > t + > t + . It follows that @p =@aj a=0 < 0.
Second, since v B > k I from Assumption 1,
if and only if b S (2 + ) (3 + ) > 2 B ( + ).
Appendix C4: Proof of Proposition 2
For all parameter values, consumer adoption decreases with a at a = b S , as
We now compute dD B =da at a = 0 for low and high values of B . First, we have
and hence, D B is increasing with a at a = 0 for low values of B . Second, we compute dD B =da at a = 0 at the maximum value of B that is given by Assumption 2(i). We have
This expression has the sign of 4(b S ) 2 (3 + ) (5 + ) t(17 2 + 6 + 2 ), which is positive for high values of b S , and negative otherwise. To sum up, if B is high and b S is low, D B is decreasing both at a = 0 and at a = b S . Otherwise, D B is increasing at a = 0 and decreasing at a = b S .
Appendix C5: Proof of Proposition 3
and hence, dn S =da has the sign opposite to that of K. We …nd that K = (t + (2 (v B k I ) + 1 + 2 ) )K 1 , and therefore, from Assumption 1, K has the sign of K 1 . K 1 is a polynomial of degree 2 of B and it has an inverted bell curve, as the coe¢ cient in ( B ) 2 is positive, since
2 + :::,
We compute the discriminant of K 1 and show that it is strictly negative if t is su¢ ciently high, which proves that dn S =da > 0.
The discriminant of K 1 is equal to K 1 = 16 (b S a) 2 t 2 4 ( + ) g, and hence, it has the opposite sign to that of g. We have g = 2 (4 + )
Note that gj t=0 < 0. However, the …rst two terms of g can rearranged so that g = 2t [t (4 + ) (b S a) (2b S (3 + ) a (2 + ) (5 + ))] + gj t=0 .
Since the …rst term in the equation above is increasing in t, then g is positive for su¢ ciently high values of t. A su¢ cient condition is
S ( + ) (7 + 4 ) , which shows that dn S =da < 0 for most parameter values.
We …nd that
As v B > c I from Assumption 1, the numerator is strictly positive if
which is a slightly stronger condition than Assumptions 2(ii) and 2(iii). The denominator is positive
All in all, it means that @ i =@p j j P > 0 if t is su¢ ciently high.
Appendix C7: Comparison of a , a B , a S and a V There are two cases. Either the interchange fee that maximizes consumer adoption is equal to zero, or the interchange fee that maximizes consumer adoption is an interior solution. Our aim is to compare a B , a S and a in the second case. We have
which from (15) is equivalent to
in a symmetric equilibrium. Simplifying this expression by =t, we obtain that, in a symmetric equilibrium, dp
:
We denote the transaction volume by V = n S D B . We have
Since V is concave in a, we have a B a V . We denote by M = p + an S k I the margin of an issuer in a symmetric equilibrium. Since dM da = dp da + n S + dn S da , and since n S = (a)D B , we have
We denote by the pro…t of an issuer in a symmetric equilibrium. Since
Since is concave in a, (For Marc: can this be shown or is this an assumption?) a su¢ cient condition for a B to be higher than a is that
We now proceed by comparing a and a V . We have:
Since is concave in a, a su¢ cient condition for a V a is that dp da
This condition can be interpreted as follows: the marginal revenue obtained from an increase of the interchange fee, taking the volume of transactions as …xed, is positive at a = a V .
Appendix C8: Welfare analysis
The merchants'surplus is
De…ne u = v B + + B n S p . In a symmetric equilibrium, the total consumer surplus is
S da dp da .
The variations of the total user surplus, T U S = M S + CS, with the interchange fee are
Under the assumption that T U S is concave in a, if
we have a > a W , where a W denotes the interchange fee that maximizes social welfare. We have dT U S da a=a = dn S da a=a n S (a ) + + u (a ) 2t B dp da a=a + u (a ) 2t .
If dn S da a=a B + n S (a ) + u (a )=(2t) dp da a=a , we have a a W . Otherwise, we have a a W .
Appendix D1: Proof of Lemma 5
In equilibrium, we have R i ( i ; j ; R j ( i ; j ; p i )) = p i , and R j ( i ; j ; R i ( i ; j ; p j )) = p j , where R i and R j denote the best response functions of …rm i and …rm j, respectively.
Let P = (p 1 ; p 2 ). We have
It follows that
We start by showing that
Using the implicit function theorem, we have
0.
We now prove that @ 2 i @p 2 i P @ 2 j @p 2 j P @ 2 i @p i @p j P @ 2 j @p i @p j P 0.
From the second-order condition (13), since @e n S =@p i = @e n S =@p j and @ e D i B =@p i = @ e D Proof.
Lemma 7 Replacing for x and y in B, we obtain that B = 1 t 2 t 2 y 2 (1 + 2ax + 2ax(1 + ax)) t y (2 + ax(1 ax) 2 B x(2 + ax)) As 1 + ax > 0, we have 2 + ax(1 ax) > 2(1 + ax) > 0. Hence, (2 + ax(1 ax) 2 B x(2 + ax)) 0.
This implies that B is positive for low values of and negative for high values of (as B is strictly decreasing in ).
Similarly, @p i =@ j has the same sign as C, where
Since 
Since C 0, we conclude that @p i =@ j 0.
Appendix D2:
(à écrire)
